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Abstract
The 21st century has been partly defined by the regression of liberal democracies paired with the
rise of modern authoritarian regimes. This phenomenon is marked by a decrease in civil liberties
and an erosion of democratic institutions and practices. A free and independent press is often one
of the first institutions targeted by rising authoritarian leaders, due to its nature as a government
watchdog. This thesis analyzes the state of press freedoms in different authoritarian and illiberal
regimes. It aims to answer the question: what is the correlation between the type of government
and the way the government treats the press, and why might this correlation exist? The case
studies, Turkey, Egypt, and Hungary, represent the spectrum of regimes that fall under the
umbrella of authoritarianism and will be used to exemplify the wide-ranging methods of
restriction and manipulation that are being used against the press. These methods are employed
through the judiciary and new legislation, economic manipulation, and intimidation of
journalists. The research draws a line of correlation between these methods and the types of
regimes that use them. It finds that the more authoritarian leaning a regime is, the more it is
going to restrict its press, because of a lack of governmental checks and balances. This thesis will
support further research in identifying the warning signs of an independent press at risk, and thus
a democracy at risk.
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Introduction
“The erosion of press freedoms is both a symptom of and a contributor to the breakdown of
other democratic institutions and principles, a fact that makes it especially alarming.” 1
In an eroding democracy, press freedoms are one of the first things to be targeted. This is
because the press has immense influence on the public. The press not only serves as a watchdog
for the government, but also relays information to the people who use it to make decisions about
the future of a country. When democracy is diminished, the independent press declines with it.
There is a global decline in liberal democracy. It has been happening for at least a decade and is
coupled with a rise of authoritarianism. In authoritarian regimes, civil society is repressed, and
free speech and thought are discouraged. As such, authoritarian regimes do not protect the press
and its autonomy. Instead, authoritarian leaders see the press as a threat to their rule and try to
restrict its ability to do its job. This thesis will analyze press freedoms and their relationship to
authoritarian regimes.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to restricting the press, however. Regimes approach this
task differently based on the structure of their government and its formal institutions. There are
many types of governments between democracy and authoritarianism, and there are many more
categories of authoritarian regimes. They can be led by a single leader, or a group of leaders.
Power can be completely consolidated under the leader, or there can be other legitimate
institutions in place that still hold power. Many times, authoritarian regimes are just lumped into
one category; their differences are not often acknowledged. Previous research explains the rise of
authoritarianism and the characteristics of authoritarian regimes. There are also bodies of
research that show the difference between press freedoms in democracies and authoritarian
regimes. However, this thesis will explain three different classifications of authoritarian regimes
and draw a line of correlation between these different regimes and their relationship to the press.
Given the global increase in authoritarianism that we are currently experiencing, this thesis will
help highlight the warning signs of a democracy at risk through the examination of the press.
This thesis aims to answer the following questions: How are authoritarian regimes restricting and
manipulating the press? What is the correlation between the regime type and its treatment of the
press? Why might this correlation exist? I will argue that the more repressive and openly
authoritarian a government is, the more willing they are to use harsher methods of repression
against the press. In newer authoritarian regimes, to maintain the facade of democracy, leaders
are becoming more covert in their efforts to curb press freedoms.
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Sarah Cook, Zselyke Csaky, Adrian Shahbaz, and Sarah Cook. “Media Freedom 2019: A Downward
Spiral.” Freedom House, 2019.

Methodology
I was first exposed to the issue of democratic backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism in a
seminar titled “The World of Democracy” with Dr. Thomas DeLuca. This class served as an
inspiration for my thesis topic. In this class we tried to define democracy and tracked the rise and
fall of democracies throughout world history up until present day. We found that the erosion of
democracy happening right now is correlated to a rise of authoritarianism. This alarming
phenomenon is happening everywhere, from President Bolsonaro in Brazil to the Peace and
Justice Party in Poland.
I wrote a research paper in this class where I evaluated the democratic qualities of two countries
using a set of self-determined criteria. One of the criteria I assessed was media freedoms. In my
research I discovered that there is a plethora of legal obstacles to press freedoms and free speech
in other countries, and there are even more extralegal methods that governments use to keep the
press under control.
I initially expected my thesis to be an assessment of global press freedoms. However, I wanted to
draw the connection between governments and press freedoms. In choosing states to analyze, I
discovered authoritarian regimes that had different characteristics and methods of repressing the
media and other institutions. Upon researching the different classifications of authoritarianism, I
decided my thesis will focus solely on press freedoms in illiberal democracies and authoritarian
regimes.
My three case studies, Hungary, Turkey and Egypt, represent different types of authoritarianism.
Egypt is the control group because it has been an authoritarian regime for most of its existence
and uses traditional methods of restricting the media. Turkey’s newer version of authoritarianism
happened through a number of legal measures, making it unique. I was inspired to write about
Hungary after reading The Nationalist Revival by John B. Judis. This book explains how the rise
of nationalism in Hungary has garnered support for the leading political party, the populist
Fidesz Party, and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The government has been dismantling
democratic institutions over the years by using this nationalist rhetoric to distract the people and
maintain their support. The thesis will focus more on Turkey and Hungary as the newer versions
of authoritarianism and emerging phenomenon of illiberal democracy, respectively, with Egypt
being used to compare and contrast press freedoms and the methods used to restrict them.
These countries were chosen based on reports by Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders
(RSF). Reporters Without Borders releases a world press freedom index 2 each year, evaluating
press freedoms in every country. In 2021, Turkey ranked 153 out of 180 countries, Hungary
ranked 92, and Egypt was ranked 166. Both Hungary and Egypt’s ratings dropped multiple spots
from 2019. Turkey was the only one of the three whose ranking went up from 2019 to 2021.
Similarly, Freedom House3 evaluates democracies around the world. In 2021, Turkey received a
32 out of 100, which falls under the “not free” category. Egypt received an 18 out of 100, and
Hungary received a 69 out of 100 (“partly free”). I also source information from the Committee
2
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“2021 World Press Freedom Index.” RSF. Accessed December 27, 2021.
“Turkey: 2021 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2021; “Egypt: 2021 Country Report,” Freedom
House, 2021; “Hungary: 2021 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2021.

to Protect Journalists, a non-governmental organization that promotes global press freedom. CPJ
tracks restrictions against the press around the world and documents abuses against journalists
including imprisonment, harassment, and murder data for journalists.
It is important to acknowledge that although I use democracy ratings like Freedom House, there
is no objective set of criteria for democracy. The criteria I discuss in this thesis are only a
handful of necessary criteria for evaluating democracy.
The paper will be structured as follows: each case study will be presented with a historical
overview on their leaders and background on the media climate in the country. There will be an
explanation of most of the methods used to restrict and manipulate press freedoms. I will then
discuss the classifications of each state’s political system. First, I will explain the difference
between traditional and modern authoritarianism. I will use this explanation to classify each state
as a specific authoritarian regime. In the case of Hungary, I will present evidence that it is an
illiberal democracy on the path to modern authoritarianism. I will then draw a line of analysis
between the government classification and its treatment of the press, thus answering the thesis
question. I will conclude with a comparison of each state and speculate as to why there is a
correlation between government type and press freedoms.

5

Case Study: Egypt
“While populist leaders in democracies seek to secure and build on their gains by taming the
press, established autocratic governments continue to tighten the screws on dissenting voices, as
any breach in their media dominance threatens to expose official wrongdoing or debunk official
narratives.”4
Historical Overview
President Hosni Mubarak ruled Egypt as a dictator from 1981 to 2011. He was ousted during the
Arab Spring, a string of revolutionary movements that started in Tunisia in 2011 and swept the
Middle East and North Africa. Following his fall, the Egyptian military stepped in to retain
power while the country was in transition. At this time, the Muslim Brotherhood, a popular
Islamist organization, formed a political party known as the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
under the leadership of Muhammad Morsi. In the first democratic elections the country had seen,
the FJP won the two-thirds parliamentary majority, and Morsi won the presidency. 5 Despite the
democratic nature of the elections, Morsi’s rule did not last long. Dissatisfaction rose after two
actions. First, Morsi implemented a slew of presidential decrees that expanded his power and
used them to appoint loyal Brotherhood members to key political positions. Second, the
government imposed a “religiously tinged constitution.”6 Both of these actions led to mass
protests and a coup by army commander General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2013, after only one
year of democratic rule.
Muslim Brotherhood members and those who opposed the coup took to the streets in protests,
but the military violently repressed these protests and designated the Muslim Brotherhood a
terrorist organization. Hundreds of protestors were killed, and thousands of Muslim Brotherhood
members and dissenters were arrested. 7 In 2014, Sisi announced his presidential campaign and,
in light of a low voter turnout and questionable legitimacy, won with more than 96% of the
vote.8 With this election, Sisi quashed hopes of a democratic state and instead fashioned his
government into an authoritarian body in which opposition was limited. In 2018, Sisi won the
presidential election again in a landslide victory. Opposition groups described the election as
“farcical”9 after three other contenders dropped out, presumably under political pressure by Sisi,
and another was arrested.

Sarah Cook, “Media Freedom 2019.”
William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 6th ed. (Westview
Press, 2016), 545.
6
Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 546.
7
"Egypt President Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi: Ruler with an Iron Grip," BBC News.
8
Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 547.
9
“Al-Sisi: Ruler with an Iron Grip.”
4
5
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In 2019 a “tightly-controlled”10 referendum greatly expanded President Sisi’s powers. It
included, among other amendments, the extension of presidential terms. It also grants the
president full autonomy over judicial appointments, up to the supreme court level.11
Media Background
The 2021 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders ranks Egypt at 166 out of
180 countries. Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2020 report found that Egypt has a 57.3%
internet penetration rate. In 2020, Egypt imprisoned 27 journalists, making it the world’s third
worst jailer of journalists.12
The government has always had some sort of indirect control over the media. During the 1967
Six Day War, this control shifted to direct control for the sake of national security. During
Mubarak’s presidency, the government went back to indirect media controls. In 1996, new
definitions of libel and increased prosecutions of journalists resulted in a brief return to direct
control of the media.13
After the 2011 Arab Spring and the end of Mubarak’s rule, there was a burst of independent
media and opposition outlets. This did not last long, and the media was restricted once again
following the 2013 coup. As a result, “the media quickly became caught in the political power
struggles between opponents and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.” 14 The Muslim
Brotherhood is a restricted topic in the media.

Restrictions and Manipulations
Intimidation
Intimidation in Egypt takes the form of raids and detainment of journalists. This intimidation is
further legitimized by arbitrary legislation and creates a chilling effect for journalists who are
critical of the government. In May 2016, the government came under fire for ceding two islands
in the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia. Following critical media coverage of the decision, the state’s
National Security Agency raided the offices of the Press Syndicate 15 and arrested several
prominent media members. The offices of many other news agencies have been raided since
then, including Mada-Masr and Masr al-Arabia. In 2018, Masr al-Arabia’s offices were raided
after the outlet published a translated New York Times article about the elections in Egypt.
Cook, “Media Freedom 2019.”
“Constitutional Amendments in Egypt: What Texts will be Amended?” BBC News Arabic, April 9,
2019.
12
“Journalists Imprisoned 2020.” Map. Committee to Protect Journalists.
13
Jenifer Whitten-Woodring and Douglas A. Van Belle, Historical Guide to World Media Freedom: A
Country-by-Country Analysis (United States: SAGE Publications, 2014).
14
Ibid.
15
A press syndicate is an organization that distributes news materials to various networks and
newspapers.
10
11
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Plainclothes officers entered the office and detained staff for hours as they searched their laptops
and software. A year later, a similar incident occurred at Mada-Masr following the release of an
investigative story about the president’s son.16
Aside from raids, journalists have also been detained for unlawful amounts of time and subjected
to illegal interrogations. Under Egyptian law, “[prosecutors can] hold detainees for 15 days,
renewable for up to 5 months without judicial review, after which judges can order them for 45
days, renewable for up to 2 years without trial.” 17 After this period, detainees are supposed to be
freed, but there has been a cycle of prosecutors recharging detainees to reset the 2-year
detainment. Journalists are regularly arrested on trumped up terror and false new charges and
then held for years in pretrial detention.
A 2020 investigation by Amnesty International found that, “the detention and prosecution of at
least 37 journalists stems solely from their legitimate work or the peaceful exercise of their right
to freedom of expression.”18 The detention and interrogation of these journalists rarely focuses
on the charges at hand and often is used to intimidate and harass journalists to receive more
information. The report goes on to explain: “In seven of the cases…officials relentlessly
interrogated detained journalists about their colleagues including those who publish
anonymously, unnamed sources…and their views expressed on social media…journalists were
threatened with torture if they failed to disclose this information.” 19 The fear of prosecution,
along with the use of force both during and after detainment, restricts journalists from publishing
critical work that is a necessary aspect of press freedoms.
Legislation
The Egyptian government leverages legislation and judicial bodies to imprison journalists and
censor news outlets. One such piece of legislation is the Antiterror Law. The law utilizes vague
language that is manipulated to prosecute journalists who report on politically sensitive and
controversial topics. For example, a terrorist act is defined as “any use of force, violence, threat
or intimidation domestically or abroad for the purpose of disturbing public order, or endangering
the safety, interests, or security of the community; harming individuals…” 20 The list goes on and
encompasses many different acts. Article 28 of the law seems to address journalists, saying,
“Whoever promotes or prepares to promote, directly or indirectly, the perpetration of any
terrorist crime, whether verbally, in writing, or by any other means, shall be punished by
imprisonment.”21 This law does not directly target journalists, but the inclusion of “in writing,”
allows the legislation to target those who write about terrorist acts. The ambiguity of this
language not only creates a chilling effect for journalists who fear prosecution, but also allows
journalists to be arrested on trumped up charges using this legislation. 22
16

"Egypt: Prisons Are Now Journalists' Newsrooms," Amnesty International, June 1, 2021.
17
Dalia Fahmy, "Suspended Animation: The Weaponization of Pre-Trial Detention in Egypt,"
DAWN, October 2, 2020.
18
“Prisons are Journalists’ Newsrooms.”
19
Ibid.
20
"Egypt's Anti-Terror Law: A Translation," Atlantic Council, August 15, 2019.
21
Ibid.
22
“Prisons are Journalists’ Newsrooms.”
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Another law that is vague and creates overarching power for the government is Law No. 180
(passed in 2018). It consists of amendments to Law No. 62, passed in 2016, which was a body of
legislation that changed the composition of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, an
authoritative body that oversees media operations and regulations. Under Law 180, Supreme
Council membership was reduced from 13 members to only 9. Additionally, the president, Sisi,
can now appoint two members to the council, including the head of the Council, and chooses
another member who has been nominated by parliament. Previously, members of the press were
involved in the selection process for the council, thus allowing journalists to have a direct say in
media regulation. With these amendments, the number of members nominated by journalists was
reduced from four to only two. As a result, “the majority of the members of the Supreme Council
are not working in the press and the media.” 23 The members also tend to be loyalists or
government sympathizers.
Other amendments to Law 62 greatly expand the powers of censorship and regulation for the
Supreme Council. These amendments are as follows:
Article 4: “The Supreme Media Council has the right, for reasons of national security, to
prevent the dissemination of publications, newspapers, media, or advertising materials
issued or broadcast from either inside or outside Egypt if they contain any information
that disturbs the public peace or promotes discrimination, violence, racism, hatred, or
intolerance.”
Article 5: “The Supreme Media Authority [has] the power to deny an operating license or
permit to a media outlet or to close the outlet down if it promotes religious
discrimination.”
Article 12: “Journalists or media personnel have the right to attend conferences and
public meetings, conduct meetings with citizens, and take pictures of public places [only]
after obtaining the necessary permits from the Supreme Media Council.”
Article 19: “The Supreme Media Council [has] the authority to suspend any personal
website, blog, or social media account that has 5,000 followers or more if it posts fake
news, promotes violence, or spreads hateful views.”24
These laws give the Supreme Media Council almost absolute authority over media regulation.
Given that most of the members of the council are Sisi loyalists, it is evident that there is little to
no independent media regulation in the country.
Censorship
Antiterror acts and false news legislation have been used as an excuse to censor content and
news outlets in Egypt. Between 2017 and 2020, an estimated 600 news and human rights
websites have been blocked. 25 In May 2017, the government ordered internet service providers to
23

"The Supreme Council for Media Regulation: A Reading into the Competencies and Practices,"
Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression, April 22, 2019.
24
"Egypt: Parliament Passes Amendments to Media and Press Law," The Library of Congress,
2018.
25
"World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Egypt," Human Rights Watch, January 14, 2020.
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block access to 21 news sites for “publishing content that supports terrorism and extremism and
deliberately spreads lies.”26 The sites that were blocked included foreign sites like Al-Jazeera and
the Huffington Post’s Arabic-language site, as well as local independent outlets like Rassd, AlShaab and Mada Masr, an investigative news site. According to the editors of Mada Masr and
Huffington Post, neither the government nor internet service providers alerted the outlets that
their sites would be taken down. Many of these sites had previously posted articles that were
critical of the government or exposed government-related scandals.
In April 2019, following the ratification of Law No. 180, thousands more sites were temporarily
blocked. There was a referendum taking place that month to expand President Sisi’s powers and
extend his term until 2030. Ahead of the voting, an online petition against the constitutional
amendments gained traction, with tens of thousands of people signing it. Hours after its launch,
the site and thousands of other sites that shared the same hosting service were blocked. One of
the sites that was blocked was Al-Mashhad, a news site. In March of that year, Al-Masshad
published an investigative piece that alleged police were “helping secure food packages to offer
in exchange for votes.”27 The site was blocked for six months, but after an appeal the block was
supposed to be reduced to one month. However, the site was still blocked in May of that year.
In April 2020, the news site Darb was blocked by authorities only a month after its launch. Darb
was run by the opposition Socialist Popular Movement Party. It covered sensitive topics such as
detained activists and the spread of Covid-19 in prisons, and often published stories critical of
the government.28 Technically, the banning of Darb and other sites was legal under Law No. 180
and the antiterror legislation. However, this evidence supports the theory that this censorship
specifically targeted sites (news and otherwise) that were critical of the government.

26

Elijah Zarwan, "Egypt Blocks Access to 21 News Websites," Committee to Protect Journalists, May
26,
2017.
27
M. Elhaeis, "Egypt Tests New Censorship Law with Handling of Al-Mashhad Website Block,"
Committee to Protect Journalists, May 7, 2019.
28
“Prisons are Journalists’ Newsrooms.”
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Case Study 2: Turkey
“The AKP government views the news media as a politically engaged economic enterprise
rather than a public service that functions to check and balance political authority in a liberal
democracy.”29
Historical Overview
Turkey has always had a turbulent relationship with democracy. Once the hub of the Ottoman
empire, the country has deep Islamic roots. But after the state of Turkey was founded by Kemal
Ataturk in 1923, it underwent a rapid period of secularization. This resulted in a country
suspended between secularism and Islamism.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won parliamentary elections in 2002. Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, founder and leader of the AKP, was elected prime minister in 2003. The AKP is a
conservative group with Islamic roots, yet it originally campaigned itself as a secular,
progressive party. The party implemented constitutional amendments to strengthen democracy
and promote human rights. Around this time the country was also vying for EU membership. It
wasn’t long, however, before the government’s Islamist roots began to show, much to the dismay
of the country’s secular counterparts. In 2013, a series of anti-government protests broke out in
the country.30 In 2014, Erdogan was elected president.
The 2016 attempted military coup was perhaps the biggest catalyst of President Erdogan’s
consolidation. On July 15, 2016, the military unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the
president. The attempted coup was widely condemned by the people and politicians alike, and
Erdogan was swift to punish those involved. Within 24 hours, more than 3,000 soldiers were
detained, and hundreds of judges were dismissed. 31 This continued for a year; “the ensuing
crackdown has seen 150,000 public sector workers suspended and 50,000 people from the
military, police, judiciary, education, and press arrested on terror charges.” 32
President Erdogan seized the opportunity of unrest in the country to hold a national referendum
in 2017. This referendum expanded the power of the president and abolished the office of the
prime minister, thus giving the president the role of head of government. The amendments also
greatly increased the president’s influence over the judiciary and judicial appointments. 33

Akser and Baybars-Hawks, “Media and Democracy in Turkey,” 315.
The Gezi Park protests began as a series of protests against the destruction of a local park and soon
turned into nationwide demonstrations against the government’s authoritarian nature and religious
conservatism. See “Rise of the AKP in the 21st Century,” Encyclopædia Britannica.
31
Ahmed Abd Rabou, “Good Governance and Civil-Security Relations: A Comparative Study of Turkey
and Egypt,” (2021), 106.
32
“Unsurprisingly, with the large numbers of arrested and detained army and police officers, it is widely
argued that president Erdoğan seized the opportunity the coup attempt offered to take severe
countermeasures that not only targeted the coup plotters from the military but extended to include
bureaucrats, teachers, scholars, and journalists who were believed to have connections with the
Gülen movement.” See Rabou, “Good Governance,” 107.
33
“Rise of the AKP,” Encyclopædia Britannica.
29
30
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Erdogan is still able to remain head of the AKP party in addition to these roles. The AKP has a
coalition government with the conservative MHP (Nationalist Movement Party).
Media Background
In the 1990s, while Turkey was applying for an EU membership, the government expanded the
legislative framework for media freedoms and protections. But “this Europeanization of policymaking did not result in a paradigmatic change or transformation in the recognition of media
freedoms but was rather limited to legislative adaptation.” 34 When the AKP rose to power in
2002, the party promised to uphold these media freedoms.
Turkey has many controversial aspects of its history that the government discourages reporters
from discussing. The Armenian genocide is an example of this. 35 The Syrian War and the
Kurdish conflict are also two contemporary controversies that the government discourages news
outlets from covering, and often punishes journalists for reporting on these conflicts. In 2020, 38
journalists were imprisoned in Turkey. 36
A survey by Reuters found that 41% of respondents trust the news overall in the country.
Reporters without Borders gave Turkey a ranking of 153 out of 180 countries in their 2021 press
freedoms report.37 After a 2016 coup attempt, the government ordered more than 150 media
outlets to close, most of them independently owned. 38
Restrictions and Manipulations
Judicial Bodies
Turkey’s government has all but eradicated the independent judiciary in the country. 39 As such,
the government uses legislative and judicial methods to restrict the media.
The government uses seemingly autonomous institutions to pressure media conglomerates. Many
of these conglomerates are owned by government allies and are pressured to support the
government in their outlets. One institution that oversees these conglomerates is the Savings
Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). It has the authority to “appropriate and resell the property and
liquidity of businesses due to bankruptcy or criminal sentencing of the owner.”40 This institution
works in tandem with the judiciary to suppress the media.
One such example of this is the Uzan Group, a family group that owned various media outlets in
Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s. During the 2007 elections Cem Uzan, a candidate in the election,
Akser, “Media and Democracy,” 304.
The Armenian genocide was the deportation and mass killing of as many as one million Armenians by
the Ottoman Empire. It took place from 1915 to 1916.
36
“Journalists Imprisoned 2020,” CPJ.
37
“2021 World Press Freedoms Index.”
38
Ibid.
39
“Turkey: Freedom in the World 2021.”
40
Akser, “Media and Democracy in Turkey,” 310.
34

35
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openly criticized the AKP and Prime Minister Erdogan. After the election, the Uzan family faced
lawsuits for their work with Motorola and were forced to flee the country.
Their conglomerate was seized by TMSF, and the media assets were redistributed to government
friendly companies.41 One of the winners of these media assets was the Dogan Group. Ironically,
the owner of the Dogan Group made the same mistake as Cem Uzan and openly criticized
Erdogan. This time, however, Erdogan not only employed economic and judicial tools like he
did with the Uzan Group, but also attacked the group with rhetoric and other non-governmental
methods. The Dogan group similarly lost its media assets and once again the assets were
redistributed to pro-government companies.
Another institution that is used to manipulate the media is the High Council for Broadcasting
(RTUK). The RTUK is the main media regulation body in the country. It is composed mainly of
AKP-loyalists and works in tandem with the judiciary to promote AKP favored policies. Given
the influence of the AKP in these seemingly autonomous institutions, and the fact that these
institutions work with the judiciary, it is significantly easier for the government to revise
legislation and imprison journalists on trumped up charges.42 More than 200 journalists have
been arrested in Turkey in the last five years, 43 making it one of the world’s worst jailers of
journalists. The fear of imprisonment has what is known as a chilling effect on journalists.44
Legislation
Turkey’s legislation includes strict antiterrorism laws that are manipulated to repress reporting
on sensitive topics such as the Armenian genocide, Cyprus and the Kurdish conflict. It also
targets the Kurdish group the PKK, which is outlawed as a terrorist organization. Like Egypt,
this legislation is often used to prosecute journalists. Those who question the security forces are
accused of espionage and “defaming the judicial system.” 45 RSF has reported on numerous
journalists who are currently detained for their investigative reporting.
In 2021, Turkey passed perhaps the most restrictive internet legislation yet. The new legislation
“requires sites with more than a million daily users to appoint a local representative…to enforce
court orders to remove content” and requires platforms to localize their user data. 46 By localizing
user data and creating local representatives, these companies are now subject to local legislation,
which gives the government greater influence over their platforms. Local representatives are at
41

Ibid.
The Council of Judges and Prosecutors, HSYK, oversees judicial appointments. The president can
appoint 4 members. Parliament can appoint 7 members. See Serap Yazıcı, "Constitutional
Amendments of 2017: Transition to Presidentialism in Turkey,” Hauser Global Law School
Program.
43
“Turkey: Press Freedom in Figures.” RSF. January 29, 2021.
44
“Even if Turkey is no longer the world’s biggest jailer of journalists, the risk of imprisonment and the
fear of having to work under judicial control or being stripped of one’s passport are still
ubiquitous. Around 50 journalists were briefly arrested in 2020 in connection with their coverage
of the situation of Syrian refugees at the border with Greece or the Covid-19 pandemic.” See
“Portrait of Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Reporters without Borders,” RSF, June 30, 2021.
45
“Turkey Using Terrorism Legislation to Gag and Jail Journalists.” RSF, June 15, 2021.
46
Ayla Jean Yackley, "Turkey's Social Media Law: A Cautionary Tale," POLITICO, March 31, 2021.
42
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risk of prosecution or harassment, making it “extremely difficult to defy the government’s grip
on online content.”47 So far, Twitter, Facebook and Google have appointed local representatives
in the country.
Censorship
Turkey also has a slew of legislation targeting the internet and social media, which vastly
restricts the way journalists and even ordinary people can communicate information. The first of
these is Law 5651. The law aims to minimize defamatory videos and obscene content on the
internet. Between 2007—when the law was implemented—and 2009, 3,700 websites were
blocked. This included prominent sites such as YouTube, and news sites that report on southeast
Turkey, where much of the conflict with the Kurds takes place. 48
In addition to this censorship legislation, Turkey also floods social media companies with
removal requests to censor content that they cannot censor themselves. Some social media
sites—specifically Twitter, which is popular amongst journalists—have a “country withheld
content” policy that allows governments to submit tweets and accounts for removal based on
federal laws. The aforementioned antiterrorism law is often used to submit these requests.
Twitter does not remove these posts globally but removes them in the country that requested it.
In 2014, Turkey requested to remove 432 pieces of Twitter content (accounts and tweets); by the
end of 2017, that number was more than 6,000. As shown in Figure 1, Turkey’s content removal
requests make up most of the world’s removal requests. Figure 2 shows the parallel between
Twitter censorship and political developments in the country.
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The Committee to Protect Journalists also found that from 2014 to 2017, at least 59 of those
restricted accounts were journalists and media outlets with a combined following of over six
million users.51
Accreditation Discrimination
The government’s attitude towards the press is also very telling of its attitude towards protecting
its freedom. The government’s unofficial “safe” press list “includes journalists deemed safe and
friendly; they are given direct access to the prime minister and government officials.” Journalists
critical of the government or not aligned with the AKP are often denied access to government
officials. Erdogan has also been known to hold meetings with media barons—most of whom are
aligned with the government—to discuss what to publish and broadcast. 52
Rhetoric
The rhetoric that the government uses against the media is also an important yet underrated tool
of manipulation. As mentioned in the legislation section, the Dogan Group was an unfortunate
victim of Erdogan’s harsh rhetoric and manipulation. In 2008, Dogan-owned newspapers began
publishing stories on alleged fraud by the AKP. After receiving criticism from the government,
the newspapers went on to publicly reveal the AKP’s attempted repression through political and
economic pressure. Erdogan responded by accusing the Dogan Media Group of fraud and
publishing false news and made an open call to his party to boycott any Dogan-owned media
outlets. The government and its supporters began public campaigns to smear the group’s name.
This included portraying the group as “rich, snobbish, high class and bourgeoisie.” This portrayal
of certain media outlets as “richmen’s pawns” 53 is a popular tactic used by Erdogan. It pits the
people against these so-called elitist news groups and erodes the trust in these outlets.
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Case Study 3: Hungary
“Score declines linked to economic manipulation of media-—including cases in which the
government directs advertising to friendly outlets or encourages business allies to buy those that
are critical—were more common across Europe over the past five years than in other parts of
the world.”54
Historical Overview
The Fidesz Party first came to the national stage in the 1998 elections. The party won 148 seats
in parliament, and joined two other conservative, right wing groups to form a coalition. During
this election Viktor Orbán, a lifelong politician and one of the founders of Fidesz, was also
elected prime minister. From the start, his campaign and his time in office was characterized by
strong conservative and nationalist sentiments. This didn’t last long though; in 2002, Orbán lost
reelection and Fidesz’s control in parliament slipped.
In 2010, the Fidesz Party made its comeback. Orbán was elected prime minister again and for the
first time in Hungary’s history, a single party won two-thirds majority in parliament. 55 This
election marked the beginning of Orbán’s consolidation of power. In 2011, he announced a new
constitution called the Fundamental Law of Hungary. It was pushed through parliament in just
nine days and came into force in 2012.
The independent judiciary was one of many sectors targeted in this new constitution. First, the
selection process for court justices was amended. Instead of an all-party committee that proposed
candidates, the appointment was a decision of the Fidesz-ruling parliament. The number of
justices on the bench rose from 11 to 15, allowing the Fidesz-ruling parliament to choose five
new justices (there was already one vacancy). Parliament now also had the power to appoint the
president of the constitutional court, something that was previously left to the judges themselves.
The retirement age of judges was lowered and affected more than 200 sitting judges. 56 The
Supreme Court was abolished and recreated as the Kuria, and the head of the Kuria was,
unsurprisingly, chosen by parliamentary majority. The constitution similarly consolidated power
in the finance, education and media sectors. In March 2013, parliament voted to further curb the
court’s powers; laws previously overturned by the constitutional court were made into
constitutional law and written into the constitution. In sum, “the Orbán regime was able to effect
‘an unconstitutional coup…[under] the cover of constitutionality, with constitutional means.’” 57
Fidesz continued to win parliamentary majority and Orbán was reelected as prime minister in
2014 and 2018.
Media Background and Landscape
Hungary was part of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, and as such did not experience free
media until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. It wasn’t until the 1994 elections, with the
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winners campaigning on free media and economic reform, that restrictions loosened in the
country. From 2002 to 2010, Hungary’s media was classified as “free” in accordance with
Freedom House’s criteria. 58 After this, media freedoms began to decline as the Fidesz party
gained majority in parliament and Viktor Orbán was elected prime minister once again.
This year, Hungary ranked 92nd out of 180 countries on RSF’s World Press Freedom Index,
down 3 points (89th) from 2020. After 27 years, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty relaunched its
operations in Hungary in 2020. This reflects concerns from the international community over
press freedoms in the country. A report by Reuters found that only 30% of Hungarian
respondents trust the news that they receive. There is an 83% internet penetration rate according
to Reuters and according to Daily News Hungary, 83% of Hungarians get their news online.
Restrictions and Manipulations
Media capture
According to a 2019 report on media freedoms, score declines in Europe specifically were linked
to economic manipulation of the media, “including cases in which the government directs
advertising to friendly outlets or encourages business allies to buy those that are critical.” 59 This
type of economic manipulation is frequent in Hungary, where the Fidesz Party has taken control
of much of the media. As of 2020, as much as 80% of the media market, if not more, consisted of
pro-government news outlets, with roughly 41% of online media also composed of progovernment outlets.60 In 2020, a pro-government businessman by the name of Miklos Vaszily
bought a 50% stake in Indamedia, a company that controls funding for Hungarian news outlet
Index, the country’s largest independent news outlet. Editor-in-Chief Szabolcs Dull was fired
after the transition and much of the staff subsequently resigned in protest. The staff then went on
to create their own independent outlet, Telex, with the help of crowdfunding campaigns. 61
Although this is perhaps the most publicized instance of media capture in Hungary, it is not the
first time this has happened. In 2016, Hungary’s then-largest independent news outlet
Népszabadság closed for financial reasons. However, many employees believed that financial
issues were not the true underlying cause of this closure, which came just days after the
newspaper reported a scandal involving politicians closely linked to Prime Minister Orbán. 62
After the 2018 national elections, a slew of newspapers owned by oligarch Lajos Simicska were
closed due to rifts with Orbán and the Fidesz Party. Simicska was originally a member of Fidesz
and a staunch supporter of Orbán, but after a falling out, Simicska used his media empire to
publicly support the Jobbik party in national elections.63 When Fidesz won the elections,
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Simicska was forced to shutter his outlets, including 80-year-old daily newspaper Magyar
Nemzet.64
Advertising bias
In a time where the news media is shifting from print to digital and many independent outlets are
struggling to stay afloat financially, advertising has arguably become more important than ever
in maintaining financial stability. Because of this, the state is using its own advertising powers to
support pro-government outlets and punish independent and opposition media.
In 2014, the government introduced a tax on advertising revenue for media companies. One of
the victims of this tax was the independent, German-owned media company RTL Klub, the most
popular commercial television channel in Hungary. Ultimately, RTL Klub was subjected to tax
rates as high as 40%. Many believed it was an intentional move to cinch the media through
financial means. “The objective of the introduction of this tax is nothing less than an aggressive
attempt by the government to undermine the biggest media company of the country, which has
proved its independence from the political parties and the government over the past 17 years,” a
spokesperson for RTL Hungary said at the time. 65
Lajos Simicska’s outlets are another example of the way state advertising is being co-opted.
Before Simicska’s public fallout with Fidesz, and the subsequent closing of most of his media
outlets, his company benefited greatly from state advertising. Simicska purchased a daily named
Metropol in 2011 and “immediately after the month of purchase, [Metropol’s] share in stateowned firms’ print advertising jumped to above 50%,”66 after being below 20%. This is shown in
Figure 3. The green line represents Simicska’s purchase.
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Figure 3.67
After his public fallout with Fidesz, state-owned firms’ advertising for two of Simicska’s dailies
(Metropol and Magyar Nemzet) dropped more than 40%. This is shown in Figure 4. Notably,
there was no change in private firms’ advertising, thus cementing the fact that the government
yielded its financial powers to punish Simicska. 68
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Figure 4.69
Legislation and Decrees
In 2011, a media law came into effect establishing the National Media and Infocommunications
Authority (NMHH), a council of politically appointed members to oversee the media. Under this
law, journalists could be fined for “imbalanced news coverage” or for publishing “immoral”
content. In 2012, a court ruled that print and online media would be exempt from the oversight of
the NMHH.70 However, the prevailing presence of the NMHH has a chilling effect on journalists
who fear repercussions for publishing honest yet controversial news.71
The Covid-19 pandemic is an excuse for the government to enact tighter restrictions on the
media in the name of public health and safety. The government approved a “state of danger”
during the first wave of the pandemic in 2020, which gave the government power to rule by
decree. The Authorization Act was passed soon after, allowing the government to rule by decree
on matters connected to the management of the pandemic. In addition to this, it also lifted the 15day limit on decrees, meaning they can be upheld for as long as necessary. Predictably, the
government seized the opportunity to pass decrees on matters unrelated to the pandemic.
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One such decree was an amendment to the criminal code that made scaremongering and
spreading false news about Covid-19 illegal. Journalists were not specifically targeted in this
amendment; however, it had a chilling effect on reporters and many of their sources.
Additionally, hospital workers have been barred from talking to journalists, making it nearly
impossible for reporters to obtain crucial and honest information about the pandemic. 72
Orbán’s use of packing the courts is reflected in his most recent move to shut down Klubrádió,
the last private broadcasting company. The outlet was known for criticizing Orbán and the
Fidesz party, and the government had slowly but surely been stripping its national frequencies
and pulling its advertising revenue over the years. On February 14, 2021, the government refused
to renew Klubrádió’s license due to “major regulatory infringements.” 73
Orbán also employs decrees to restrict the press without any obstacles. One of the major shifts in
media freedoms came in 2018 when Orbán passed a decree that allowed the merging of more
than 450 pro-government media outlets into one conglomerate. The decree overrode numerous
bureaucratic steps for approval, with Orbán claiming that this conglomerate was “of strategic
importance at a national level” and a matter of public interest. 74 The Central European Press and
Media Foundation, known as KESMA, was created after 476 media outlets were handed over to
the organization for free. As a result, “40 percent of the turnover from the news and public life
segment of the Hungarian media market is now concentrated in KESMA.”75
Social Media Manipulation
Aside from restrictions, the government is using the media as a tool to push its own ideology. It
is doing so across a number of different mediums, with some of their most recent endeavors
being through social media. Fidesz is expanding to social media, with the help of media
organization Megafon. Megafon is offering free workshops to social media users that will
“transform you into a professional Facebook warrior,”76 according to its advertisement video.
The goal is to amplify right-wing voices on social media77 so as to target and gain support from
the youth. A recent poll by Median, a Hungarian site, found that only 22% of those under 30
support the Fidesz Party. 78 Megafon claims to be independent from any political parties or
organizations, yet the founder Istvan Kovacs has close ties to the Fidesz party. Kovacs once
famously said it was time to stop the “left wing liberal tsunami of public opinion.” 79 Orbán is not
just restricting the press, but its using social media—a medium that is popular with journalists—
to influence people and push Fidesz-centered ideology.
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Discussion: Classifying Political Systems
Before discussing the correlation between the government and its treatment of the press, it is first
necessary to classify each of these states.
This thesis emphasizes the difference between traditional and modern authoritarian regimes to
demonstrate how modern regimes are co-opting and manipulating the press in more subtle ways
than long-time authoritarian ones. But what is the difference between a traditional and modern
authoritarian regime? Freedom House defines traditional authoritarianism as a state that “sought
monopolistic control over political life, a one-party system organized around a strongman or
military junta, and direct rule by the executive, sometimes through martial law, with little or no
role for the parliament.”80 The use of force is common, especially in military dictatorships. This
definition of traditional authoritarianism reflects the state of Egypt.
Modern authoritarian regimes, in contrast, are characterized by more subtle means of repression.
Unlike traditional regimes, modern regimes do not strive to enact totalitarian control over every
aspect of people’s lives and beliefs. Freedom House explains, “The leaders of today’s
authoritarian systems devote full-time attention to the challenge of crippling the opposition
without annihilating it and flouting the rule of law while maintaining a plausible veneer of order,
legitimacy, and prosperity.” Their strategy is to neutralize—not destroy—institutions that pose a
threat to their leadership. Their methods include controlling elements of key sectors like the
economy, “legalized political repression,” secretive use of extralegal force or violence—usually
against critics and opponents—and limiting the opposition’s presence in elections. Turkey is an
example of a modern authoritarian regime. And although Hungary is still classified as a
democracy, it is nonetheless following the path to modern authoritarianism.
Egypt
Of the three case studies presented in this thesis, Egypt portrays a traditional authoritarian
regime, per the definition above. Its government today can be classified as a military autocracy.
Emphasis is placed on the military because Egypt’s political history has long been entwined with
its military history. The military replaced Mubarak during the Arab Spring, and Sisi replaced
Morsi in power through a military coup. Autocracy is defined as a government controlled by one
person. Autocracies can also be controlled by groups like the military. Egypt is a military
autocracy because although Sisi has consolidated power solely under himself, the military plays
a large role in society. Like Sisi, many of the people in his cabinet and in high-level government
positions have ties to the military. This is the pattern that Egypt has always followed: “Every
non-interim president of Egypt, with the exception of Morsi, has had a military background.” 81
This close relationship between the head of state and the military, an entity that is inherently
forceful and unabashed, suggests why the press is treated the way it is in Egypt. The military is a
very powerful sector in Egypt and if Sisi’s government has that power backing them, it is easy to
employ the harsh methods they use and face little repercussions or opposition.
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Egypt’s most common methods of press repression are legislation, censorship and intimidation.
The government often uses antiterrorism and national security legislation to prevent journalists
from critical reporting. The Muslim Brotherhood was banned and declared a terrorist
organization after the 2013 coup. Journalists who report on anything even remotely related to the
Muslim Brotherhood or other controversial topics can be accused of being part of a terrorist
organization and prosecuted. The language included in Egypt’s antiterror legislation is purposely
vague and usually doesn’t explicitly outline how or why a person is considered a terrorist or what
specific actions are considered acts of terror, meaning the legislation can be used in a number of
ways without much room for a defense from the accused.
Unlike other countries in this thesis, Egypt’s censorship is significantly more straightforward and
doesn’t always require sound legislation or due process for content to be censored. Websites,
specifically independent news sites, are often blocked in the country without any warning. There
are examples of sites being blocked after reporters published stories that paint the government in
a bad light.
Intimidation is the last major method of repression. There are reports of journalists being
illegally detained and tortured. News offices have been subjected to raids without any sort of
arrest. These reactionary measures almost always follow critical coverage of the government.
These methods don’t just create a chilling effect for journalists. They also put journalists at risk
of physical harm. The government of Egypt is not afraid to send a message to reporters that
critical or oppositional reporting is not permitted in the country. In Egypt, there are very few
checks and balances in place to stop the government from carrying out these methods of
repression. There is virtually no independent judiciary, and the legislature—which is not very
influential to begin with—consists of a pro-government majority.82 The government is not scared
of backlash when employing these harsh methods, because there are very few, if any,
consequences.
Turkey
Unlike Egypt, Turkey is a modern authoritarian regime. It can be classified as a competitive
authoritarian regime. This term was coined in 2002 by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. They
explain, “In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed
as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those
rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional
minimum standards for democracy.”83 It is not democracy, but it is not full-scale
authoritarianism either. There are four criteria that are important in a liberal democracy: free and
fair elections, universal suffrage, protection of political rights and civil liberties, and an
independent legislature. These practices can be and are violated at times in democratic states;
however, in authoritarian regimes, they are violated systematically and consistently enough that
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they impede democratic gains. In other words, these violations “create an uneven playing field
between government and opposition.”84
These states fall short of full-scale authoritarianism because leaders do not fully eliminate
democratic institutions and practices, even if they do manipulate them. Erdogan and the AKP use
democratic means (elections) to secure a spot in the political realm, and from there manipulate
the system from within. They use their majority in parliament to create constitutional
amendments, smear the opposition and subordinate the judiciary. But even with this
manipulation, the democratic institutions and practices in place still hold legitimacy and thus
pose a real threat to leaders. 85
Levitsky and Way identify four sectors that are in constant conflict with authoritarian leaders: the
electoral process, legislature, judiciary, and media. Elections are competitive, yet still marred
with biased media coverage and harassment of the opposition. As seen in Turkey, the judiciary’s
independence is at stake, and the AKP holds a majority in parliament. In the media, legislation,
judicial bodies, and censorship are the main methods of repression. Turkey’s anti-terror law is
used to detain journalists who report on such controversial topics as the PKK and Syria, and the
government also passed new legislation restricting social media platforms. These platforms,
which are popular forms of communication for journalists, are now required to appoint a local
representative to respond to content removal requests by the government. These requests are
used to censor online content, and Turkey has one of the highest rates of removal requests in the
world.
Turkey also censors online content—news sites and social media platforms alike—under Law
5561. This law gives the government the right to censor defamatory content and obscenity
online. As with other legislation, the language in this law is vague and often used for unrelated
content.
The use of seemingly independent judicial bodies to take down news outlets is also popular in
Turkey. The TMSF has seized and resold various news outlets owned by groups who have gone
against the AKP. The High Council for Broadcasting is a media regulation body with extensive
ties to the AKP. This body is responsible for overseeing legislation like Law 5561 and thus has
immense influence on censorship.
Erdogan also employs extralegal methods of manipulation. His rhetoric against the press is harsh
and often paints them as “richmen’s pawns”. He also allegedly has a “safe” press list of
journalists that he will talk to; unsurprisingly, most of these journalists are from state-owned or
state-friendly outlets.
The Turkish government employs the use of both softer methods like the judiciary and rhetoric,
and harsher methods like imprisoning journalists. These methods mirror its place as a
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competitive authoritarian regime. It’s not a traditional authoritarian regime, so although
imprisonment is common, reports of torture and the use of force against journalists is less
common. The use of the judiciary exemplifies a key characteristic of modern authoritarian
regimes: manipulation of formal institutions from the inside. The press is subjected to arbitrary
censorship and national security legislation that can only be upheld in a judiciary that is no
longer independent.
Hungary
Hungary stands apart from the other two countries in this thesis because it is still widely
classified as a democracy. However, the country is following the path of modern
authoritarianism, and many of the tactics used by Orbán and Fidesz are similar to those of
Erdogan and the AKP.
Hungary is currently classified as an illiberal democracy. The word democracy is usually equated
with free elections, the rule of law and individual rights like free speech, assembly and more.
However, these connotations are derived from the definition of a liberal democracy, or what
most western countries model their democracy after. In the last half-century, the emergence of
illiberal democracies has challenged this preconceived notion of democracy. Illiberal
democracies are “countries that had initiated a transition away from authoritarian rule and had
adopted free elections but had failed to build the liberal institutions that could guarantee
individual rights.”86 The idea first came about in 1997 by Fareed Zakaria. 87 His article “The Rise
of Illiberal Democracy” argues that constitutional liberalism does not equate to democracy, and
the tension between these ideals is what leads to illiberal democracies. States often create
democratic institutions and follow the model of democracy without implementing liberal
institutions alongside it. This leads to a consolidation of power by the leader or party, who thinks
that being democratically elected gives them the right to absolute sovereignty. 88
Hungary is an illiberal democracy because of the erosion of its democratic institutions. The
legislature is ruled by a Fidesz-led coalition supermajority. Orbán’s government amended the
constitution to consolidate judicial power under parliament. Democratic practices still exist in the
country and maintain legitimacy, and Orbán’s authoritarian nature is garnering attention by the
public and the international community. Because of this, democratic practices are still respected,
even if they are abused by those in power.
Freedom House’s 2019 media freedom report89 addresses what the author calls the “illiberal
toolbox” for restricting and manipulating the media. The report explains, “This toolbox leaves
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out tactics like censorship, force, or outright intimidation of journalists. Instead, it contains a
collection of methods used to harness structural conditions. Once successful co-optation has
taken place, media are incorporated into the system as building blocks that prop up those in
power.”90 The report goes on to explain the different ways this co-optation takes place, seen in
the graphics below:

90

Ibid.

28

The findings in this report are supported by the government’s treatment of the media. The
Freedom House report identifies economic manipulation (“tilting the market”) as one method of
co-optation. The government uses financial and economic methods because it is more subtle than
outright censorship or intimidation. As much as 80% of Hungary’s media is owned by the
government or pro-government allies. KESMA, a conglomerate of more than 400 media
organizations, is an example of media capture and “exhibits in plain sight the astonishing
domination of government-friendly media in Hungary.” Hungary’s government also uses
advertising to reward and punish outlets, depending on their stance on the government; Freedom
House found that “in 2018, state ad spending was five times more than under previous
governments a decade earlier, with a whopping 85 percent of contracts awarded to governmentfriendly companies.”
Wielding the law is another method identified in the report. Orbán uses decrees to pass
questionable legislation. These decrees are attributed to national security and the Covid-19 has
been used more recently to bypass the traditional methods of approving legislation.
In addition to restricting the media to keep it pro-government, Hungary also exemplifies the way
it has created a “parallel reality” for discourse. The pro-government company Megafon has
created workshops to teach right-wing social media users how to spread their ideology more
effectively. Orbán is also known for using harsh rhetoric against the press, including calling
stories fake news when they paint his government in a bad light.
These methods show the government’s disrespect for democratic institutions, but also reveal the
lack of accountability by the government for their treatment of the press. Many of the
developments in Hungary are carefully crafted by the government yet are often attributed to
relevant excuses—like the COVID-19 pandemic—or blamed as being out of the government’s
hands. This is evident in the use of economic methods. The government can “plausibly deny
responsibility for this [strategy], as it relies on players on the market and in institutions
supposedly outside the government’s control.” The government has purchased many news
outlets, but even more are being bought by pro-government businesses, and it is this independent
ownership that allows the government to evade blame for the lack of independent media. 91
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Analysis
Egypt’s methods of repression are much more straightforward and harsher than Hungary’s main
method of media capture and Turkey’s preferred method of judicial action. Egypt’s history and
tradition of authoritarianism means the government is more comfortable employing these
methods of repression because of a lack of checks and balances in the government.
For the most part, Egypt has always been an authoritarian regime or military dictatorship. Much
of the power was consolidated under a single leader or the military under a single commander.
Sisi staged a coup during protests against Morsi and went on to hold presidential elections (in
which he won 96% of the vote) only after he was already in power. Sisi’s government consists of
a cabinet of close allies, and the 2019 referendum expanded his powers over the legislature and
judiciary. Outside of himself and his cabinet, there are few institutions that hold legitimate
power. This means there are virtually no checks and balances that Sisi must go through to pass
arbitrary laws and justify illegal detainments, for example, thus making it easier for his
government to employ the methods that it does.
In contrast, modern authoritarian regimes often still have checks and balances in place that
prevent a government from fully dismantling democratic institutions. The main centers of power
in Turkey and Hungary are the AKP and the Fidesz Party, respectively, because the legislature
still holds legitimate power. Although Erdogan and Orbán are consolidating power in their
respective roles as president and prime minister, they are using their parties’ immense influence
to wield this power. Erdogan needs the AKP and its majority in parliament to push legislation
that consolidates his power and restrict liberties such as press freedoms. In Hungary, Orbán
needs the Fidesz party and its coalition supermajority in parliament to pass decrees and push
legislation through parliament so quickly. These leaders cannot do this alone. As democracies,
these states still have the structures in place that guarantee—at least to some extent—checks and
balances and room for pluralism. These leaders must use their ties with political parties to
neutralize their countries’ checks and balances and co-opt democratic institutions like the media
from the inside.
It is evident that the presence of a working system of governmental checks and balances is key to
the maintenance of any kind of freely functioning press. In Hungary, oppositional parties, the
people and even the European Union are raising alarms about the state of government and the
treatment of the press. The erosion of an independent press is still happening, but people are
noticing. This is also happening in Egypt, and people are noticing, but there is no check in place
to stop Sisi or investigate the issue further. This is an important difference because Egypt is
using methods like censorship and intimidation against the press, which are much more obvious
means of repression. There are reports of journalists being illegally detained and even tortured.
Although Hungary and Turkey are still attacking the press, it has not—at least not yet—gotten to
this point, and there seems to be enough attention drawn to it that it may never get to that point.
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Conclusion
This research aimed to identify the correlation between state types and their treatment of the
press. Through the evaluation of Turkey, Egypt, and Hungary’s press freedoms it is evident that
the more authoritarian leaning a regime is, the more it is going to restrict its press. Furthermore,
the discussion of state classifications found that traditional authoritarian regimes are more likely
to use harsh methods of repression while modern authoritarian regimes and illiberal
democracies—which were proven to be states on the path to modern authoritarianism—use
subtle or “softer” methods of repression. Egypt’s long history of authoritarianism and political
ties to the military show that it is more comfortable using forceful actions like detainment. In
contrast, Turkey’s newer version of authoritarianism means that its government is eroding the
independence of its institutions from the inside and using them to restrict the press. In other
words, it uses questionable co-optation of its institutions to create legal measures to erode press
freedoms. In Hungary, a country on the brink of authoritarianism but still classified as an illiberal
democracy, the government relies on secretive economic methods that allow it to evade blame
for the erosion of press freedoms.
The discussion reveals and supports the theory that different authoritarian regimes use different
levels of restrictions because of the prevalence and legitimacy of checks and balances in a
government. Egypt's history as an authoritarian state means any checks or opposition are long
gone or repressed enough that the government can use methods of force. In newer authoritarian
regimes and illiberal democracies like Turkey and Hungary, respectively, the existence of
legitimate democratic institutions and oppositional political parties means these governments
have less power to use methods of force and instead must resort to restricting the press through
legal and economic means.
This thesis has shown that the press transcends every sector of society and government. It acts as
a watchdog of the government, and it is responsible for relaying information to the public—
information that is then used to make informed decisions on laws and leaders. The press holds an
immense amount of power; as such, a free and independent press can be dangerous to
authoritarian regimes. Because of this, it is important to know the warning signs of an
independent press at risk. This thesis has not only shown the way in which this independence can
be eroded but has drawn a line of correlation between these methods and the types of regimes
that use each method. To better identify these warning signs, future research should prioritize
identifying the type of authoritarianism in a regime. This will allow for a deeper understanding
of why a particular regime is using the methods of restriction and co-optation that they are, as
well as provide a more personalized analysis of a democracy at risk.
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